Joseph Torigian challenges conventional accounts of how Leninist regimes manage leadership succession, arguing that personal prestige, historical relationships, and violence mattered more than formal institutions or collective decision-making. Torigian, a political scientist at American University, compares the transitions following Stalin's death in 1953 and Mao's death in 1976, showing how outcomes depended on contingent factors that institutional analysis cannot capture. Khrushchev and Deng Xiaoping prevailed not because of their positions in party hierarchies but because of reputations earned through wartime leadership, networks of personal loyalty, and willingness to use force against rivals. The book draws on extensive archival research in Russian and Chinese sources, many not previously used by Western scholars, to reconstruct the maneuvering within each succession crisis. Torigian argues that the image of Leninist parties as rule-bound institutions masks how much depends on individual biography and interpersonal conflict. His comparative method illuminates both the similarities between Soviet and Chinese politics and the specific historical circumstances that shaped each case. The book contributes to debates about authoritarian resilience by showing how regimes without legitimate succession mechanisms become dependent on the charisma and cunning of particular leaders rather than stable institutional arrangements.