Daniel Carpenter's 'The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy' examines how federal agencies built independent power bases that allowed them to pursue policy goals even against presidential or congressional preferences. Carpenter, a political scientist at Harvard, focuses on the Post Office, Department of Agriculture, and Food and Drug Administration in the Progressive Era, showing how their leaders cultivated reputations that translated into political influence. Rather than seeing bureaucratic autonomy as pathological, Carpenter demonstrates that agencies with strong reputations for competence and public service could mobilize external constituencies to protect their programs and resist political interference. The book's detailed case studies show how Harvey Wiley built the FDA's reputation through pure food crusades, how the USDA developed relationships with farmers that gave it independent political resources, and how postal officials created networks of businessmen invested in their services. Carpenter's theory of 'reputational autonomy' provides a framework for understanding why some agencies develop greater independence than others. While the historical material is specific to the early twentieth century, the analysis illuminates contemporary questions about the relationship between expertise, politics, and democratic accountability. Readers interested in American political development or bureaucratic politics will find path-breaking scholarship.