The Missing Peace provides Dennis Ross's insider account of American diplomacy in the Middle East from 1988 to 2001, covering the Madrid Conference, Oslo Accords, and the failed Camp David summit. Ross served as the senior American negotiator throughout this period under both Republican and Democratic administrations, giving him unique access to the decision-making of American, Israeli, and Arab leaders. The book details the backroom negotiations that rarely appear in news accounts: how deals were structured, why certain proposals failed, and what individual leaders were thinking at crucial moments. Ross provides extensive accounts of conversations with Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat, Hafez al-Assad, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Ehud Barak. He is candid about his own assessments and mistakes while also offering judgments about the leaders he encountered, particularly Arafat, whom he holds responsible for rejecting opportunities for peace. Critics have challenged Ross's interpretations, particularly regarding the Camp David summit, but even skeptics acknowledge the documentary value of his detailed record. For readers seeking to understand this pivotal period in Middle East diplomacy, Ross's massive account—over 800 pages—provides essential primary material.